In this paper, we investigate combinatorial properties and constructions of two recent topics of cryptographic interest, namely frameproof codes for digital ngerprinting, and traceability schemes for broadcast encryption. We rst give combinatorial descriptions of these two objects in terms of set systems, and also discuss the Hamming distance of frameproof codes when viewed as error-correcting codes. From these descriptions, it is seen that existence of a c-traceability scheme implies the existence of a c-frameproof code. We then give several constructions of frameproof codes and traceability schemes by using combinatorial structures such as t-designs, packing designs, error-correcting codes and perfect hash families. We also investigate embeddings of frameproof codes and traceability schemes, which allow a given scheme to be expanded at a later date to accommodate more users. Finally, we look brie y at bounds which establish necessary conditions for existence of these structures.
Introduction
Traceability schemes for broadcast encryption were de ned by Chor, Fiat and Naor 8], and frameproof codes for digital ngerprinting were proposed by Boneh and Shaw 4] . Although these two objects were designed for di erent purposes, they have some similar aspects. One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate the relations between traceability schemes and frameproof codes. We rst give combinatorial descriptions of these two objects in terms of set systems, and also discuss the Hamming distance of frameproof codes when viewed as error-correcting codes. From these descriptions, it is seen that existence of a c-traceability scheme implies the existence of a c-frameproof code.
In 4, 8] , some constructions of frameproof codes and traceability schemes were provided. We will provide new (explicit) constructions by using combinatorial structures such as t-designs, packing designs, error-correcting codes and perfect hash families. We also investigate embeddings of frameproof codes and traceability schemes, which allow a given scheme to be expanded at a later date to accommodate more users. Finally, we look brie y at bounds which establish necessary conditions for existence of these structures.
In this rest of this section we review the de nitions of c-frameproof codes and ctraceability schemes which were given in 4] and 8], respectively.
Frameproof codes
In order to protect a product (such as computer software, for example), a distributor marks each copy with some codeword and then ships each user his data marked with that codeword (for some examples of how this might be done in practice, see 5] ). This marking allows the distributor to detect any unauthorized copy and trace it back to the user. Since a marked object can be traced, the users will be deterred from releasing an unauthorized copy. However, a coalition of users may detect some of the marks, namely the ones where their copies di er. They can then change these marks arbitrarily. To prevent a group of users from \framing" another user, Boneh and Shaw 4] de ned the concept of c-frameproof codes. A c-frameproof code has the property that no coalition of at most c users can frame a user not in the coalition.
Let v and b be positive integers (b denotes the number of users in the scheme). A set ? = fw (1) ; w (2) ; : : : ; w 2 F(C)nC, then user j could be \framed" if the coalition C produces the v-tuple w (j) . FPC(3; 4) . The matrix depicting the code is as follows: 
Traceability schemes
In many situations, such as a pay-per-view television broadcast, the data is only available to authorized users. To prevent an unauthorized user from accessing the data, the data supplier will encrypt the data and give the authorized users keys to decrypt it. Some unauthorized users (pirate users) might obtain some decryption keys from a group of one or more authorized users (called traitors). Then the pirate users can decrypt data that they are not entitled to. To prevent this, Chor, Fiat and Naor 8] devised a traitor tracing scheme, called a traceability scheme, which will reveal at least one traitor on the con scation of a pirate decoder.
Suppose there are a total of b users. The data supplier generates a base set T of v keys and assigns k keys to each user. These k keys comprise a user's personal key, and we will denote the personal key for user U by P(U). A message consists of an enabling block and a cipher block. A cipher block is the encryption of the actual plaintext data using some secret key S. The enabling block consists of data, which is encrypted using some or all of the v keys in the base set, the decryption of which will allow the recovery of S. Every authorized user should be able to recover S using his or her personal key, and then decrypt the cipher block using S to obtain the plaintext data.
Some traitors may conspire and give an unauthorized user a \pirate decoder", F. The pirate decoder F will consist of k base keys, chosen from T, such that F U2C P(U),
where C is the coalition of traitors. An unauthorized user may be able to decrypt S using a pirate decoder F. The goal of the data supplier is to assign keys to the users in such a way that when a pirate decoder is captured and the keys it possesses are examined, it should be possible to detect at least one traitor in the coalition C, provided that jCj c (where c is a predetermined threshold).
Traitor detection would be done by computing jF \P(U)j for all users U. If jF \P(U)j jF \ P(V )j for all users V 6 = U, then U is de ned to be an exposed user. De nition 1.2 Suppose any exposed user U is a member of the coalition C whenever a pirate decoder F is produced by C and jCj c. Then the scheme is called a c-traceability scheme and it is denoted by c-TS(k; b; v).
Let us now brie y discuss the di erence between our scheme and that of 8]. In 8], v = nk for some integer n, and the set T of base keys is partitioned into k subsets S i , each of size n. We will denote S i = fs i;1 ; s i;2 ; : : : ; s i;n g, 1 i k. Each personal key P(U) is a transversal of (S 1 ; : : : ; S k ) (i.e., it contains exactly one key from each S i ). Suppose the secret key S is chosen from an abelian group G. To encrypt S, the data supplier splits S into k shares r 1 ; r 2 ; : : : ; r k 2 G such that P r i = S. Then, for 1 i n, he encrypts every share r i with each of the n keys in S i by computing t i;j = r i + s i;j . The nk values t i;j comprise the enabling block. Each authorized user has one key from S i , so he or she can decrypt every r i , and thus compute S.
In our de nition, we do not require that each personal key be a transversal. A personal key can be made up of any selection of k base keys from the set T. The data supplier can use a k out of v threshold scheme (such as the Shamir scheme 13], for example) to construct v shares of the key S, and then encrypt each share r i with the key s i , for every s i 2 T.
Note that our de nition is a generalization of the one given in 8]. However, the generalization has to do with the way that the enabling block is formed, and not with the traceability property of the scheme. Our de nition of the traceability property is the same as in 8]. where all arithmetic is done in Z 21 . (This is an application of a construction we will present in Theorem 3.5.) It can be shown that any two base keys occur together in exactly one personal key. Now, consider what happens when two traitors U and V construct a pirate decoder, F. The pirate decoder F must contain at least three personal keys from P(U) or P(V ). However, for any other user W 6 = U; V , jF \ P(W)j 2. Hence either U or V will be the exposed user if the pirate decoder F is examined.
Previous results
In the construction of frameproof codes and traceability schemes, the main goal is to accommodate as many users as possible. In other words, we want to nd constructions with b as large as possible, given values for the parameters c and v (and k, in the case of traceability schemes). In general, we would prefer explicit constructions for these objects as opposed to non-constructive existence results. However, as noted in 4], the proof is not constructive. Hence, they also provide an explicit construction for a c-FPC v; 2 p v=c .
Similarly, Chor, Fiat and Naor 8] gave an interesting non-constructive existence result for traceability schemes, as follows. We will provide several explicit constructions for frameproof codes and traceability schemes later in this paper. Although our constructions may not be as good asymptotically as those in 4] and 8], they will often be better for relatively small values of c and v. (For example, in order to obtain b 2 in Theorem 1.1, it is necessary to take v 16c 2 , so the construction is not useful for small values of v.) As well, our constructions are very simple and could be implemented very easily and e ciently.
Combinatorial descriptions
In this section, we give combinatorial descriptions of c-frameproof codes and c-traceability schemes. From these descriptions, it is fairly easy to see that the existence of a c-TS(k; b; v) implies the existence of a c-FPC(v; b).
We will use the terminology of set systems. A set system is a pair (X; B) where X is a set of elements called points, and B is a set of subsets of X, the members of which are called blocks. A set system can be described by an incidence matrix. Let (X; B) be a set system where X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x v g and B = fB 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B b g. The incidence matrix of (X; B) is the b v matrix A = (a ij ), where
0 if x j 6 2 B i .
Conversely, given an incidence matrix, we can de ne an associated set system in an obvious way.
Description of c-frameproof codes
Since a c-FPC(v; b) is a b v (0; 1)-matrix, we can view a frameproof code as an incidence matrix or as a set system, as de ned above. We have the following characterization of frameproof codes as set systems. 
Proof. Suppose w (1) ; w (2) ; : : : ; w Suppose B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B d are the blocks in the set system corresponding to the d codewords w (1) ; w (2) ; : : : ; w (d) . 
Relationship of traceability schemes and frameproof codes
We prove the following theorem relating traceability schemes and frameproof codes. is di erent from w (i) and w (j) . But this is just the condition that the code is 2-frameproof (as stated in the proof of Theorem 2.1).
The following result is an immediate corollary of the previous lemma. 
Constructions from combinatorial structures
In this section, we will give some constructions of frameproof codes and traceability schemes from certain combinatorial designs, including t-designs, packing designs and orthogonal arrays. All the results on design theory that we require can be found in standard references such as the CRC Handbook of Combinatorial Designs 9].
Constructions using t-designs
First we give the de nition of a t-design.
De nition 3.1 A t-(v; k; ) design is a set system (X; B), where jXj = v, jBj = k for every B 2 B, and every t-subset of X occurs in exactly blocks in B.
Note that, by simple counting, the number of the blocks in a t-(v; k; 1) design is b = ? v t = ? k t . We will use t-(v; k; 1) designs to construct frameproof codes and traceability schemes, as described in the following theorems. Similarly There are many known results on existence and construction of t-(v; k; 1) designs for t = 2; 3. On the other hand, no t-(v; k; 1) design with v > k > t is known to exist for t 6 . However, known in nite classes of 2-and 3-designs provide some nice in nite classes of frameproof codes and traceability schemes. We illustrate with a few samples of typical results that can be obtained. A 2-(q 2 + q + 1; q + 1; 1) design is known as a projective plane of order q; such a design exists whenever q is a prime power (see 9, Chapter VI.7]). In a projective plane we have b = v, so the frameproof codes obtained from it are not interesting (in view of Example 1.1, which does better). However, the traceability schemes will be of interest. 
Constructions using packing designs
Another type of combinatorial design which can be used to construct frameproof codes and traceability schemes are packing designs. We give the de nition as follows.
De nition 3.2 A t-(v; k; ) packing design is a set system (X; B), where jXj = v, jBj = k for every B 2 B, and every t-subset of X occurs in at most blocks in B.
Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have the following construction for frameproof codes. We mentioned previously that no t-(v; k; 1) designs are known to exist if v > k > t 6. However, for any t, there are in nite classes of packing designs with a \large" number of blocks (i.e., close to ? v t = ? k t ). These can be obtained from designs known as orthogonal arrays, which are de ned as follows.
De nition 3.3 An orthogonal array OA(t; k; s) is a k s t array, with entries from a set of s 2 symbols, such that in any t rows, every t 1 column vector appears exactly once.
It is easy to obtain a packing from an orthogonal array, as shown in the next lemma. Lemma 3.9 If there is an OA(t; k; s), then there is a t-(ks; k; 1) packing design that contains s t blocks.
Proof. Suppose that there is a OA(t; k; s) with entries from the set f0; 1; : : : ; s ? 1g. De ne X = f(x; y) : 0 x k ? 1; 0 y s ? 1g. For every column (y 0 ; y 1 ; : : : ; y k?1 ) in the orthogonal array, de ne a block B = f(0; y 0 ); (1; y 1 ); : : : ; (k ?1; y k?1 )g. Let B consist of the s t blocks thus constructed. It is easy to check that (X; B) is a t-(ks; k; 1) packing design. 
Constructions using perfect hash families
In this section, we present another method to construct frameproof codes, which uses a perfect hash family.
De nition 3.4 An (n; m; w)-perfect hash family is a set of functions F such that f : f1; 2; : : : ; ng ! f1; 2; : : : ; mg for each f 2 F, and for any X f1; 2; : : : ; ng such that jXj = w, there exists at least one f 2 F such that fj X is one-to-one.
When jFj = N, an (n; m; w)-perfect hash family will be denoted by PHF(N; n; m; w).
Observe that a PHF(N; n; m; w) can be depicted as an N n matrix with entries from f1; 2; : : : ; mg, having the property that in any w columns there exists at least one row such that the w entries in the given w columns are distinct. Results on perfect hash families can be found in numerous textbooks and papers. Mehlhorn 12 ] is a good textbook source; more recent constructions can be found in the papers 2] and 3].
The following theorem tells us how to use a perfect hash family to enlarge a frameproof code. Proof. Let ? = fw (1) ; w (2) ; : : : ; w In 4], the following construction of c-frameproof codes from error-correcting codes is given.
Theorem 3.13 If there exists a c-FPC(v; q) and an (N; n) q-ary code with minimum Hamming distance d min > N(1 ? 1=c), then there exists a c-FPC(vN; n).
Alon 1] gave a construction of perfect hash families from error-correcting codes. We observe that if we use a perfect hash family constructed by Alon's method to obtain a cframeproof code by applying Theorem 3.12, then the resulting code is essentially the same as the one constructed using Theorem 3.13. However, it is possible to use other constructions for perfect hash families to obtain new examples of frameproof codes. We provide one illustration now, which uses the following recursive construction from 3]. 
Embeddings
In many cases the number of users of a scheme will increase after the system is set up. Initially, the data supplier will constuct a scheme that will accommodate a xed number of users (which we denoted by b). If the number of users eventually surpasses b, we would like a simple method of extending the scheme which is \compatible" with the existing scheme. In the case of a traceability scheme, we do not want to change the personal keys already issued when the scheme is expanded. In the case of a frameproof code, we do not want to have to recall software that has already been sold.
To solve this problem, we will introduce the concept of embedding frameproof codes and traceability schemes in larger ones. Initially, the distributor could use the code ? to mark the products. When the number of users surpasses b, then codewords in ? 0 n? are used. Note that the embedding property ensures that the codewords in ? do not have to be changed when we proceed to the larger code.
A similar de nition can be given for traceability schemes.
De nition Note that the de nition of embedding is even simpler if we consider the set system formulation of frameproof codes and traceability schemes. Namely, we say that (X; B) is embedded into (X 0 ; B 0 ) if X X 0 and B B 0 .
Since t-designs and packing designs are set systems, the above de nition of embedding applies. In fact, embeddings of combinatorial designs have been extensively studied, so we have a convenient method of constructing embeddible frameproof codes and traceability schemes. For example, in the case of 2-designs, we have the following result. Here is a small example to illustrate. Example 4.1 Given an embedding of a 2-(7; 3; 1) design into a 2-(15; 3; 1) design, a 2-FPC(7; 7) can be embedded into a 2-FPC(15; 35). The 35 codewords of the 2-FPC(15; 35) are given in Figure 1 (the rst seven codewords, when restricted to the rst seven bit positions, form the embedded 2-FPC(7; 7)). 0 B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @ 1101000 00000000 0110100 00000000 0011010 00000000 0001101 00000000 1000110 00000000 0100011 00000000 1010001 00000000 1000000 00110000 0100000 00011000 0010000 00001100 0001000 00000110 0000100 10000010 0000010 11000000 0000001 01100000 1000000 00001010 0100000 10000100 0010000 01000010 0001000 10100000 0000100 01010000 0000010 00101000 0000001 00010100 1000000 01000100 0100000 00100010 0010000 10010000 0001000 01001000 0000100 00100100 0000010 00010010 0000001 10001000 1000000 10000001 0100000 01000001 0010000 00100001 0001000 00010001 0000100 00001001 0000010 00000101 0000001 00000011 1 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A It is also well-known that for any prime power q and for any integers i j, there exists a 2-(q i ; q; 1) design which can be embedded into a 2-(q j ; q; 1) design (in other words, the a ne geometry AG(i; q) is a subgeometry of AG(j; q); see 9, Chapter VI.7]). The following result is obtained. Theorem 4.4 Let q be a prime power, and let i and j be positive integers such that i j. Then there exists a (q ? 1)-FPC(q i ; q i?1 (q i ? 1)=(q ? 1)) which can be embedded into a (q ? 1)-FPC(q j ; q j?1 (q j ? 1)=(q ? 1)), and a p q ? 1 -TS(q; q i?1 (q i ? 1)=(q ? 1); q i ) which can be embedded into a p q ? 1 -TS(q; q j?1 (q j ? 1)=(q ? 1); q j ).
Bounds
In this section, we investigate necessary conditions for existence for frameproof codes and traceability schemes. These take the form of upper bounds on b, as a function of c and v (and k, in the case of traceability schemes).
First we will give a bound for frameproof codes. Let ? = fw (1) ; : : : ; w 
Comments
Further results on frameproof codes can be found in the PhD thesis of Yeow Meng Chee 7, Chapter 9]. Chee gives a probabilistic construction for 2-frameproof codes that improves upon results in 4], and provides e cient explicit constructions for frameproof codes using the idea of superimposed codes.
